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Abstract – We study the role of alternative intertemporal preference representations
in a model of economic growth, stock pollutant and endogenous risk of catastrophic
collapse. We contrast the traditional “discounted utility” model, which assumes risk
neutrality with respect to intertemporal utility, with a multiplicative choice model that
displays risk aversion in that dimension. First, we show that both representations of
preferences can rationalize the same “business as usual” economy for a given interest
rate and no pollution externality. Second, once we introduce a collapse risk whose
hazard rate is a function of the pollution stock, multiplicative preferences recommend a
much more stringent policy response. An illustration in the context of climate change
indicates that switching to the multiplicative preference representation has a similar
eﬀect, in terms of policy recommendations, as scaling up the schedule of the hazard rate
by a factor of 100.
Re´sume´ – Nous e´tudions les implications de diﬀe´rentes repre´sentations des pre´fe´rences
intertemporelles dans un mode`le de croissance avec un stock de pollution et un risque
catastrophique endoge`ne. Nous comparons le mode`le traditionnel de l’utilite´ escompte´,
qui est neutre par rapport au risque sur l’utilite´ intertemporelle, avec un mode`le de choix
multiplicatif qui pre´sente une aversion pour ce risque. Nous montrons tout d’abord
que les deux mode`les peuvent rationaliser la meˆme e´conomie de « statu quo » sans
externalite´ de pollution, pour un niveau donne´ du taux d’inte´reˆt. Lorsque nous intro-
duisons un risque catastrophique dont la probabilite´ de´pend du stock de pollution, nous
montrons en revanche que le mode`le de choix multiplicatif recommande une politique
climatique plus forte. Nous proposons une illustration nume´rique avec un mode`le de
changement climatique qui indique que le passage au mode`le multiplicatif a un impact
qualitativement semblable (en terme de politique climatique) a` une multiplication par
100 du risque instantane´ de transition vers un e´tat post-catastrophe climatique.
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1 Introduction
A substantial part of the economic literature on climate change discusses climate policy as
an intertemporal trade-oﬀ, where the costs of an early intervention are compared with the
costs of later measures. Such an approach is for example the baseline of the prominent con-
tributions by Stern (2007) and Nordhaus (2008). This line of literature typically presumes
that anthropogenic climate change is gradual and reversible, and that the world, as we know
it, will exist for ever or, at least, that its existence may not be endangered by today’s action
(or inaction). However, recent literature on climate change reveals the very large uncer-
tainty about how greenhouse gases (GHG) could aﬀect global equilibrium temperatures,
particularly in the upper-end of the distribution (Roe and Baker, 2007; Allen and Frame,
2007), and shows an increasing concern for the risk of abrupt and irreversible changes in
the climate system (e.g. Alley et al., 2003; Lenton et al., 2008; Kriegler et al., 2009).1 There
is then the possibility that preventive measures that could be taken today may no longer
be available in the future, as a “collapse” might occur in between. The relevant trade-oﬀ is
no longer that of present consumption versus future consumption, but that of consumption
versus a risk of catastrophic climate change (Weitzman, 2009).
This paper considers a setting where a stock of emissions (GHG) increases the hazard
risk of a catastrophic collapse. We deﬁne a catastrophic collapse as an irreversible regime
shift, with post-collapse welfare independent of current actions. Such a setting has been
studied in several contributions, starting with Cropper (1976) and including Clarke and
Reed (1994), Tsur and Zemel (1996, 1998), Gjerde et al. (1999), and Karp and Tsur (2011)
among others. The most pessimistic view would be to interpret such a catastrophic collapse
as the end of humankind as we know it, but it can also consist in falling back in a kind
subsistence level. What matters for the analysis is that trajectories after the regime shift
are exogenous, so that it is not possible to invest towards post-collapse welfare.2 Such a
1The study by Lenton et al. (2008) characterizes potentially abrupt and long-lasting changes for some
major elements of the climate system, such as the weakening or shut down of the North Atlantic thermohaline
circulation, the melting of the Greenland and the West Antarctic ice sheets, the die-back of the Amazon
rainforest and the increasing frequency and amplitude of El Nin˜o-Southern Oscillation. Such low-probability
high-impact events pose major challenges to decision-makers, because of the large uncertainty about the
associated hazard rates, about the relation of these events to human emissions, and about their impact on
humankind.
2An alternative approach is to consider the risk of “tipping points”, where the realization of the risk affects
capital stock through a damage function, but where the fundamental structure of the system is not affected
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setting is a natural framework to consider a concept akin to the value of a statistical life
at the individual level, represented by the marginal rate of substitution between current
consumption and the hazard risk of a regime shift.
Our main objective is to highlight the importance of intertemporal preference represen-
tation when considering the trade-oﬀ between consumption and catastrophic risk reduction.
In the presence of a collapse risk, the time at which the regime shift occurs is a random
variable that generates a risk on intertemporal utility. For this kind of problem, relying on
the standard expected discounted utility model is a very peculiar choice, as it involves an
assumption of risk neutrality with respect to intertemporal utility (Bommier, 2006). One
may however think that for a given expected time of collapse, a social planner should prefer
to avoid the possibility of a catastrophic collapse occurring in the very short term, as it
would result in a very low level of intertemporal utility. In other words, one may want to
account for risk aversion with respect to intertemporal utility. In addition, the standard
expected discounted utility model makes it impossible to separate intertemporal elasticity
of substitution and risk aversion (Epstein and Zin, 1989). As was suggested by Epstein and
Zin (1989), a way to achieve this separation involves using the framework of dynamic choice
theory of Kreps and Porteus (1978) and allowing for preference for the timing of resolution
of uncertainty. This route was followed by many contributions in ﬁnance, but also by sev-
eral works on climate related issues (e.g. Lemoine and Traeger (2013), Cai et al. (2013)).
Working in that direction, however, involves allowing for non monotonicity of preferences
which can lead to unfortunate conclusions (Chew and Epstein (1990) Bommier and LeGrand
(2013)). Instead, this paper will use multiplicative preferences, that separate risk aversion
and elasticity of substitution, without having any of these shortcomings.
Multiplicative preferences ﬁt in the expected utility framework and therefore do not
introduce preferences for the timing. Just like in the standard expected discounted utility
model, information is assumed to have no direct contribution on utility, and is positively
valued by the agent only to the extent that it can be used to adjust his/her strategy. The
key diﬀerence between multiplicative preferences and the standard discounted utility model
and thus continues afterward (see Keller et al., 2004; Lemoine and Traeger, 2013; Cai et al., 2013). In this
setting, it is possible to invest towards welfare enjoyed after the risk is realized (see Tsur and Withagen,
2013). In contrast, we consider the case where welfare after the collapse is independent of current actions, so
that we rather consider a collapse of civilization or the natural world as we know these concepts (Weitzman,
2009).
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is that instantaneous utilities are aggregated in a multiplicative way, rather than in an
additive one. This introduces concavity in the intertemporal utility index, and thus risk
aversion over intertemporal welfare, independently from the curvature of the instantaneous
utility function. Such preferences, although much less widespread than additive ones, were
used to address a number of issues, including portfolio choices (Pye, 1973), precautionary
savings (van der Ploeg, 1993), and the equity premium (Ahn, 1989). In a social choice
setting, Bommier and Zuber (2008) have provided an axiomatic characterization of a multi-
plicative model fulﬁlling the assumption of preference stationarity. An important feature of
stationary multiplicative models is that they rule out pure time preferences. Nevertheless
time discounting arises from the combination of a risk of collapse and risk aversion with
respect to intertemporal utility, thus reconciling time discounting with an equal treatment
of generations.
As will be shown in the paper the standard discounted utility model and the multiplica-
tive model can actually yield the same social discount rate when consumption and the risk
of collapse are constant. The present paper exploits this result to compare the two mod-
els. In particular, using a traditional revealed preference approach, the steady state of an
economy with no endogenous climatic risks – which we will refer to as a “business as usual”
(BAU) economy – is taken as a common calibration target. Thus instead of discussing
how model’s predictions are impacted when changing a given parameter, or introducing
another behavioral trait, we will use diﬀerent speciﬁcations to rationalize the same economy
with exogenous collapse risk, and discuss the divergence in policy recommendation when we
introduce a hazard rate that depends on the stock of pollution.
Our results indicate that although additive and multiplicative preferences can reproduce
the same steady state equilibrium of a BAU economy, they end up providing divergent con-
clusions when the collapse risk is viewed as endogenous. The multiplicative model typically
generates a much higher social value of catastrophic risk reduction, as measured by the in-
verse of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and hazard risk of collapse at
a given date. The practical relevance of our results is illustrated through a set of numerical
simulations. As a ﬁrst step we calibrate the parameters of our model to approximate BAU
trajectories of the dynamic integrated model of climate and the economy (DICE) model by
Nordhaus (2008), and show that these are observationally equivalent under additive and
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multiplicative preference representations. We then introduce an endogenous collapse risk
represented by a hazard rate function. We ﬁnd that the multiplicative model suggests a
signiﬁcantly higher willingness to reduce the risk of collapse, and thus a more rapid intro-
duction of emissions control. Thus, although the choice between models might be considered
as purely theoretical with little practical implication in a BAU economy (i.e. when ignoring
climate risks), we show that it is a major driver of the policy response to the existence of
catastrophic climate risks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we ﬁrst present the
technological setting. Section 3 is about the social planner’s preferences, as we introduce
both additive and multiplicative choice models. Section 4 exposes the ﬁrst order conditions
that characterize optimal trajectories when working with these models, and also characterize
the steady states. Section 5 reports a quantitative illustration, contrasting optimal paths
for additive and multiplicative models under speciﬁc risk proﬁles. Section 6 concludes.
2 The economy
Time is assumed to be continuous and denoted by the letters t, τ or T .3 To simplify notation,
for any function x(·) that depends on time, we denote its value at time t by xt (and not by
x(t)). The steady state value of a variable xt is denoted as x
∗, and its entire trajectory over
time is x. Consistent with this notation we will denote the value of the functional G applied
to the proﬁle x by G(x) and the value of the function g taken at the point xt by g(xt). For
any function of time xt, the notation x˙t will refer to the derivative of x with respect to t,
i.e. x˙t =
d
dt
xt.
Consider an economy where output is associated with a ﬂow of emissions, which we
interpret as GHG emissions. Potential output at time t is denoted by yt. It is related to
physical capital at time kt through yt = f(kt). The production function f is assumed to be
increasing and concave. Like in Stockey (1998), emissions are caused by production depend-
ing on an index of the technology zt, with 0 ≤ zt ≤ 1. Actual output at time t is y¯t = ztf(kt).
The ratio of GHG emission et on potential output is given by the diﬀerentiable, increasing,
3Working in continuous time allows us to obtain simpler analytical expressions, and we thus use it for the
first sections of the paper. For the quantitative part later on, we will formulate the problem in discrete time.
Moving from continuous time to discrete time does not affect the qualitative properties of the problem.
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convex function ϕ(zt) =
et
f(kt)
. GHG concentration in the atmosphere Mt develops as:
M˙t = et − ψ
(
Mt − M¯
)
= ϕ(zt)f(kt)− ψ
(
Mt − M¯
)
(1)
where ψ is a positive real number (the natural rate of absorption), and M¯ is an equilibrium
value for GHG concentration in the absence of anthropogenic GHG emissions.
We assume the existence of a risk of catastrophic collapse that would move the economy
to a state where consumption and production trajectories are exogenous (i.e. independent
of pre-collapse actions). Intuitively, the nature of this shift is so unpredictable that it is
impossible to readily invest for post-collapse welfare. Following Clarke and Reed (1994), we
assume that the likelihood of such a collapse is a function of the pollution stock. Formally,
we write the hazard rate of a regime shift as:
µt = µ(Mt)
where µ is an increasing function. Furthermore, we will assume that µ(0) = µ0 > 0, with
µ0 small, so that the hazard rate of collapse also captures exogenous natural events. Note
that we do not consider direct damages associated with increased emissions, either through
damages reducing consumption or as an independent element of people welfare. This would
solely increase incentives to reduce emissions and distract us from the main point of the
paper.
The last aspect of the economy is a simple growth model with only one productive sector.
Each period, actual output y¯t can be either consumed ct or invested to accumulate physical
capital. The motion equation for capital is:
k˙t = ztf(kt)− δkt − ct
where δ is the instantaneous rate of capital depreciation. The planner’s problem involves
choosing the optimal trajectories for ct and zt, his objective being discussed in the next
section.
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3 Social preferences
We consider a social planner who deems that welfare at time t exclusively depends on
consumption at time t. The planner is aware of the possibility of a regime shift, and that he
cannot have any inﬂuence on what happens after such a shift. Since the regime shift does
not occur deterministically, the planner needs to compare random trajectories. We assume
that he is an expected utility maximizer, in the general sense that the utility function is the
expected value of intertemporal utilities enjoyed under alternative state of the worlds. In our
context, the planner considers the intertemporal utility associated with all possible collapse
dates, and compute the expected value using the probability distribution of collapse dates.
It is worth emphasizing that assuming expected utility does not involve making assumptions
regarding how consumption is aggregated over time to provide an intertemporal utility. The
most common approach consists in assuming that intertemporal utility equals the sum of
instantaneous utilities, but other aggregation procedures (e.g. a multiplicative aggregation)
are of course possible.
Formally, the time at which the world will experience a regime shift is viewed ex-ante as
random. Therefore, the planner assesses an inﬁnitely long consumption plan c, which may
be interrupted by a regime shift. We will denote the utility the planner associates to the
case where the consumption proﬁle c is interrupted by a regime shift at time t by U(c, t).
The planner will choose c in order to maximize his expected utility, denoted W (c), which
is simply the expected value of U(c, t) given gt, the distribution function of the random
variable t :
W (c) =
∫ +∞
0
U(c, t)gtdt (2)
Further denote the probability that the world will still be in the usual regime at time t
(the survival probability) by st. We know from survival analysis that µt =
gt
st
= − s˙t
st
. In
consequence, st = exp
(
−
∫ t
0 µτdτ
)
and
gt = µt exp
(
−
∫ t
0
µτdτ
)
= µ(Mt) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
µ(Mτ )dτ
)
. (3)
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We can thus re-express the social expected utility (2) as:
W (c) =
∫ +∞
0
U(c, t)µ(Mt) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
µ(Mτ )dτ
)
dt . (4)
Hence the social welfare function is a function of the consumption path as well as the hazard
rate associated with the trajectory of the pollution stock.
We now impose further structure on the planner’s preferences. First, we assume that
preferences are stationary in the sense of Koopmans (1960). This reﬂects the view that
preferences regarding the future should be independent of the past and of the calendar date,
and ensures that the ensuing plans are time consistent. Second, we assume that preferences
are weakly separable in the sense that their restriction to deterministic consumption paths
fulﬁlls the separability assumption described in Gorman (1968). In other words, in absence
of uncertainty, the trade oﬀ between welfare at two diﬀerent moments in time is independent
from what happens in other periods.
As is shown in Bommier (2012), these standard assumptions imply that the utility
index, whose expectation is maximized by the planner, must have either an additive or a
multiplicative structure. More speciﬁcally, assuming that exogenous post-collapse welfare
is equivalent to the welfare associated with consuming c forever, and normalizing (without
loss of generality) the utility function u(·) so that u(c) = 0, we must have:
U(c, t) =
∫ t
0
e−θτu(cτ )dτ in the additive case, (5)
U(c, t) =
1− exp
{
−ε
∫ t
0 u(cτ )dτ
}
ε
in the multiplicative case, (6)
where θ ≥ 0 is the pure rate of time preference in the additive model and ε ≥ 0 measures the
degree of absolute risk aversion with respect to intertemporal utility in the multiplicative
model (i.e. an increase in ε increases risk aversion in the sense of Kihlstrom and Mirman
(1974)). In the remainder of the paper, we call ε the temporal risk aversion parameter.
The additive model (5) is the one that has been used by most of the literature. The
behavior of the society is governed by two main features: pure time preference which is
embodied in the parameter θ, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution embodied
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in the curvature of function u. With the multiplicative model, intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is still embodied in the curvature of the function u. Time preference is set to zero
and another parameter ε is introduced. This parameter has no impact on preferences over
deterministic consumption paths. It is however key for the evaluation of random prospects.
Actually going from a smaller to a larger value of ε involves taking a concave transformation
of the (lifetime) utility index, which in expected utility theory means increasing risk aversion
(Kihlstrom and Mirman, 1974). Thus, with the multiplicative model, one element (the
function u) determines preferences in absence of uncertainty, and another one (the scalar
ε) determines the degree of risk aversion, with no impact on preferences over deterministic
consumption paths. The desired separation between intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and risk aversion is thus achieved, while retaining the same number of degrees of freedom
as in the standard discounted utility model.
The additive and multiplicative models are both extensions of the case where utility
would be given by U(c, t) =
∫ t
0 u(cτ )dτ . This speciﬁcation is indeed obtained when θ = 0
in the additive case and when ε = 0 in the multiplicative case. In the expected utility
framework, it is impossible to combine pure time preference and risk aversion with respect
to intertemporal utility without giving up the assumption of preference stationarity. Sta-
tionary preferences exhibiting both pure time preferences and risk aversion with respect
to intertemporal utility may be obtained by leaving the domain of expected utility theory,
as in the “risk-sensitive preferences” model introduced by Hansen and Sargent (1995) and
axiomatized in Bommier and LeGrand (2013). In fact, additive and multiplicative models
are just two polar cases in the class of risk-sensitive preferences. Thus, our results could be
extended to a continuum of models in which θ > 0 and ε > 0. Focusing on additive and
multiplicative speciﬁcations is however suﬃcient, and the simplest way to provide insights
about the importance of the representation of intertemporal preferences.4
Normative and ethical aspects of additive and multiplicative preferences have been dis-
cussed in Bommier and Zuber (2008). In short, pure time preferences in the additive model
imply that diﬀerent generations are given diﬀerent utility weights as a consequence of their
years or birth. This has often been criticized for being contrary to intergenerational equity.
4One technical consideration worth mentioning is that the integral in Equation (2) does not necessarily
converge. For the problem at hand however, and assuming that θ and ε are non-negative, this issue can be
avoided by making the assumption that consumption is bounded.
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Multiplicative preferences rule out pure time preferences but make it possible for the the
planner to exhibit risk aversion with respect to intertemporal utility. This may lead the so-
cial planner to choose policies that do not optimize individual expected welfare in order to
reduce the aggregate risk (Bommier and Zuber, 2008). There is a debate about such ethical
implications (Manski and Tetenov, 2007; Fleurbaey, 2010), and we do not suggest that one
model is more appropriate than the other. Rather, our aim is to highlight implications of
alternative preferences towards social risk in the context of climate change policy.
For both additive and multiplicative preferences, we can apply integration by part on
equation (4) to obtain:
W (c) =
[
−U(c, t) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
µ(Mτ )dτ
)]+∞
0
+
∫ +∞
0
dU(c, t)
dt
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
µ(Mτ )dτ
)
dt (7)
The ﬁrst term of the right hand side is zero, and the second one can be simpliﬁed by
introducing a function v(µt, ct) from R× R into R given by:
v(µt, ct) = θ + µt in the additive case, (8)
v(µt, ct) = µt + εu(ct) in the multiplicative case, (9)
We can now write equation (7) as:
W (c) =
∫ +∞
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
v(µ(Mτ ), cτ )dτ
)
u(ct)dt (10)
Using equation (10) is convenient, as the diﬀerence between both models is restricted to the
function v(µt, ct), deﬁned in (8) and (9).
For notational purposes, we write the continuation utility U(c, T ) as the future remaining
expected utility discounted at time T :
U(c, T ) =
∫ +∞
T
exp
(
−
∫ t
T
v(µ(Mτ ), cτ )dτ
)
u(ct)dt. (11)
We shall now deﬁne two important concepts.
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Definition 1 The social discount rate is:
ρ(c, T ) = −
d
dT
(
log
∂W (c)
∂cT
)
|c˙T=0 (12)
The discount rate measures how rapidly the marginal utility of consumption is declining
with time, controlling for variations in consumption.5 A similar deﬁnition can for example
be found in Epstein (1987).
The second concept quantiﬁes the willingness to sacriﬁce current consumption to lower
the hazard risk of a regime shift. It is similar to what Weitzman (2009) refers to as “the
value of statistical civilization”, or “VSL-like parameter”.
Definition 2 The social value of catastrophic risk reduction is:
V(c, T ) = −
(
∂W (c)
∂µT
)/(
∂W (c)
∂cT
)
This social value of catastrophic risk reduction is therefore simply the opposite of the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time T and hazard risk of regime
shift at time t. In the parallel literature on individual choice with endogenous mortality
(death being a particular regime shift), this is called the value of a statistical life.
The following proposition provides expressions for the social discount rate and for the
social value of catastrophic risk reduction for the additive and multiplicative cases:
Proposition 1
(a) In the additive case, the social discount rate and the social value of catastrophic risk
reduction are given by the expressions ρ(c, T ) = µ(MT ) + θ and V(c, T ) =
U(c,T )
u′(cT )
.
(b) In the multiplicative case, the social discount rate and the social value of catastrophic
risk reduction are given by the expressions ρ(c, T ) = µ(MT )1−εU(c,T ) and V(c, T ) =
U(c,T )
u′(ct)(1−εU(c,T ))
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the additive model, the discount rate is just the sum of the rate of pure time preferences
and of the hazard risk of regime shift, as is well known since Yaari (1965). In particular
5As we work in continuous time, the derivatives ∂W (c)
∂cT
is to be understood as a Volterra derivative.
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the rate of time discounting is independent of consumption. In the multiplicative model,
the discount rate involves the continuation utility, which depends on future consumption,
and future hazard risk. This implies that changing the parameters of the multiplicative
model has a non-trivial impact on the discount rate as the continuation utility function may
depend on these parameters. Along a trajectory where the hazard rate of a regime shift
and consumption are constant over time, however, the discount rate for the multiplicative
model is constant and equal to ρ(c∗, T ) = µ + εu(c∗). This has two implications. First,
the discount rate is increasing in ε. Intuitively, if a regime shift occurs, later generations
will not be able to beneﬁt from foregone consumption by early generations, which leads
a risk averse planner to put more weight on the welfare of early generations. Second,
and more importantly, both models will exhibit the same discount rate when θ = εu(c∗).
Thus although both models rely on diﬀerent fundamental assumption regarding pure time
preferences and risk aversion, in presence of a collapse risk they may end up generating an
identical degree of time discounting. This explains why we will ﬁnd that both the additive
and the multiplicative models may rationalize the same equilibrium steady state in a BAU
economy (see the discussion following Proposition 2).
As we have mentioned in the introduction, this ability of both models to generate iden-
tical discount rates makes it possible to compare these models with a revealed preference
approach. We will therefore not consider the discussion of what happens when increasing
θ in the additive model, or when changing ε in the multiplicative model. Instead we will
compare diﬀerent speciﬁcations which, for a given exogenous collapse risk, would exhibit
identical discount rates. As will be shown in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, these are speciﬁcations
that generate identical steady states and very similar transitory paths in BAU economies.
The second part of Proposition 1 shows that the additive and multiplicative models
provide very diﬀerent expressions for the social value of catastrophic risk reduction. In both
cases this value depends positively on the continuation utility (thus on future consumption),
as it increases the cost of a regime shift, and thus the willingness to pay to lower its risk. In
the additive case, continuation utility is a decreasing function of the rate of time preference.
Thus a higher preference for the present imply a lower willingness to pay for risk reduction.
In the multiplicative case the role of temporal risk aversion is less obvious, as it combines
two eﬀects. On the one hand, a greater ε implies a higher aversion to the risk of regime shift,
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thus increasing the willingness to pay for risk reduction. On the other hand, in presence
of a collapse risk, a greater ε increases the value of immediate consumption through the
discount rate, which lowers the willingness to pay for risk reduction. The overall eﬀect is
ambiguous, which is in line with ﬁndings on the role of risk aversion on preventive measures
(Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1985; Jullien et al., 1999).
In order to gain further intuition about the implications of additive and multiplicative
preferences in the presence of an endogenous collapse risk, one can observe that in the
additive case:
V(c, T ) =
ρ(c, T )U(c, T )
u′(cT )
1
µt + θ
while in the multiplicative case:
V(c, T ) =
ρ(c, T )U(c, T )
u′(cT )
1
µt
.
If consumption and the hazard rate of regime shift were to remain constant over time, then in
both models, one would have ρ(c∗, T )U(c∗, T ) = u(c∗). Further considering the relevant case
where both models imply the same discount rate, the value of catastrophic risk reduction
would be (1 + θ
µ
) larger in the multiplicative model than in the additive one. Predictions
of both models would then strongly diverge when the pure rate of time preference in the
additive model is large compared to the hazard risk.
4 Optimal paths and steady states
4.1 Business as usual
We ﬁrst study the problem of choosing an optimal consumption plan when the hazard risk
of collapse is constant and exogenous. We label this problem the BAU problem because the
planner does not account for the eﬀect of emissions on the risk of a catastrophic event. Our
objective is to highlight that additive and multiplicative preferences may yield observation-
ally equivalent equilibria in problems that focus on intertemporal consumption trade-oﬀs.
This contrasts with a setting in which the planner accounts for the eﬀects of current decisions
on the hazard of a catastrophic collapse, which we discuss next (Section 4.2).
Consider a social planner who faces a hazard risk µt = µ0 in all periods. His objective,
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which deﬁnes the BAU problem, is:
max
(c,z)
W (c) =
∫ +∞
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
v(µ(Mτ ), cτ )dτ
)
u(ct)dt (13)
s.t. k˙t = ztf(kt)− δkt − ct
µ(M) = µ0, ∀M ∈ R
with v(µt, ct) = θ + µ0 in the additive case and v(µt, ct) = µ0 + εu(ct) in the multiplicative
case.
Because the stock of pollution does not have a direct eﬀect on welfare and the impact
of pollution on the regime shift is overlooked by the planner, there will be no emission
control. Hence at the optimum we have zt = 1 for all t ∈ R. In this situation, a steady state
corresponds to an optimal path such that c˙t = k˙t = 0.
6
Proposition 2
(a) If an interior solution of Problem (13) exists, then it is characterized by the following
equations:
c˙t = −
u′(ct)
u′′(ct)
(
f ′(kt)− δ − ρ(c, t)
)
(14)
k˙t = f(kt)− ct (15)
(b) If a steady state exists for an interior solution of Problem (13), then:
(i) In the additive case, it is characterized by the following equations:
µ0 + θ = f
′(k∗)− δ (16)
f(k∗) = c∗ (17)
(ii) In the multiplicative case, it is characterized by the following equations:
µ0 + εu(c
∗) = f ′(k∗)− δ (18)
f(k∗) = c∗ (19)
6We know that z˙t = 0. There is no reason to assume that M˙t = 0 because Mt does not impact welfare
and is therefore irrelevant for the BAU problem.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
The optimal dynamics described in part (a) of Proposition 2 is the familiar optimal
growth trajectory in a one-sector model. Equation (14) is the Euler equation describing
the evolution of consumption as a function of the diﬀerence between the interest rate on
capital investments and the social discount rate. Equation (14) holds for both the additive
and multiplicative models, but the expression of the discount rate ρ(c, t) depends on the
speciﬁcation of preferences (Proposition 1). Equation (15) is the standard motion equation
for the state variable.
A noteworthy feature of Proposition 2 is the similarity of the additive and multiplicative
steady state equilibria in the BAU problem, displayed in part (b) of the Proposition. For
any θ it is possible to ﬁnd an ǫ such that the additive and multiplicative models yield the
same interest rate in the long run, and hence the same equilibrium consumption and physical
capital. In particular, it suﬃces to deﬁne ε = θ/u(c∗) for the steady state consumption and
physical capital to be the same in the additive and multiplicative cases.
While the parameters of the models can be calibrated to produce the same BAU steady
state equilibrium, short-term dynamics will diﬀer. For such a calibration, our quantitative
illustration will however suggest that optimal BAU paths for the additive and multiplicative
models are very similar (see Section 5.2 below).
4.2 Endogenous catastrophic collapse
We now come to the speciﬁc problem studied in this paper, namely the case where the social
planner anticipates the eﬀect of his actions on the probability of a regime shift. In that case,
the social planner seeks to solve the following dynamic optimization problem:
max
(c,z)
W (c) =
∫ +∞
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
v(µ(Mτ ), cτ )dτ
)
u(ct)dt (20)
s.t. k˙t = ztf(kt)− δkt − ct
M˙t = ϕ(zt)f(kt)− ψ(Mt − M¯)
with v(µt, ct) = θ + µt in the additive case and v(µt, ct) = µt + εu(ct) in the multiplicative
case.
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Deﬁning π(z) = z − ϕ(z)
ϕ′(z) , the optimal path for an interior solution of Problem (20) is
characterized as follows:
Proposition 3
(a) If an interior solution of Problem (20) exists, it is characterized by the following equa-
tions:
c˙t = −
u′(ct)
u′′(ct)
(
π(zt)f
′(kt)− δ − ρ(ct, t)
)
(21)
z˙t =
ϕ′(zt)
ϕ′′(zt)
(
ϕ′(zt)µ
′(Mt)V(ct, t) + δ −
{
ψ + π(zt)f
′(kt)
})
(22)
k˙t = ztf(kt)− ct (23)
M˙t = ϕ(zt)f(kt)− ψ(Mt − M¯) (24)
(b) If a steady state exists for an interior solution of Problem (20), then:
(i) In the additive case, it is characterized by the following equations:
µ(M∗) + θ = π(z∗)f ′(k∗)− δ (25)
π(z∗)f ′(k∗)− δ + ψ =
u(c∗)
u′(c∗)
µ′(M∗)
µ(M∗)+θϕ
′(z∗) (26)
z∗f(k∗) = c∗ (27)
ϕ(z∗)f(k∗) = ψ(M∗ − M¯) (28)
(ii) In the multiplicative case, it is characterized by the following equations:
µ(M∗) + εu(c∗) = π(z∗)f ′(k∗)− δ (29)
π(z∗)f ′(k∗)− δ + ψ =
u(c∗)
u′(c∗)
µ′(M∗)
µ(M∗)
ϕ′(z∗) (30)
z∗f(k∗) = c∗ (31)
ϕ(z∗)f(k∗) = ψ(M∗ − M¯) (32)
Proof. See Appendix C and Appendix D for the additive and multiplicative cases respec-
tively.
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To understand the optimal dynamics described in part (a) of Proposition 3, ﬁrst note
that Equation (21) is, like before, the Euler equation. It is adapted to the present setting
where net interest rate rt = π(zt)f
′(kt) − δ is adjusted to take into account the pollution
externality.
Equation (22) is an arbitrage condition on emission control. Assume that you divert
money from investments in physical capital to increase emission control (i.e. decrease zt).
The cost is given by the net interest rate rt. The beneﬁt is to decrease emissions (in
proportion ϕ′(zt)), so that the risk decreases through µ(Mt). The value of this risk reduction
is given by V(ct, t). Hence the net beneﬁt is ϕ
′(zt)µ
′(Mt)V(ct, t)− ψ, where ψ accounts for
the reduction in risk that occurs through natural absorption. The arbitrage between costs
and beneﬁts governs the evolution of emission control.
A key diﬀerence with the BAU problem is that the steady states displayed in part (b)
of Proposition 3 are diﬀerent in the additive and the multiplicative cases when they are
calibrated to the same BAU interest rate (ε = θ/u(c∗)). The key diﬀerence is in the right-
hand side of Eq. (26) and (30). The diﬀerence tends to vanish when θ is close to 0 (so that
the associated ε is close to 0). Hence, for very low values of the rate of pure time preference
(and of the temporal risk aversion parameter), the two models behave in a similar way
in the long run. This is consistent with the fact that when θ = ε = 0 the additive and
multiplicative preference models are formally identical. However, as soon as we take some
distance from this rather extreme case, the models provide very distinct predictions, as
pure time preferences and risk aversion with respect to the date of a catastrophic shift have
diﬀerent behavioral implications.
In the additive model, increasing pure time preference has two direct eﬀects. First, it
increases the social discount rate (Equation (25)). Second, it decreases the social value of
catastrophic risk reduction, which is u(c
∗)
u′(c∗)(µ(M∗)+θ) in steady state (Equation (26)). From
the eﬀect on the social discount rate, the future matters less for higher values of pure time
preference, inducing less capital accumulation that can result in less consumption and less
pollution. On the contrary, higher values of pure time preference will induce a lower value
of catastrophic reduction, and hence laxer environmental policies that can result in more
consumption and more pollution.
In the multiplicative model, increasing temporal risk aversion has only one direct eﬀect,
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which is to increase the social discount rate (Equation (29)). A higher value of the temporal
risk aversion parameter will therefore tend to decrease consumption but it has no direct
impact on the steady state value of catastrophic risk reduction, which is u(c
∗)
u′(c∗)µ(M∗) . It may
still have an indirect impact through its eﬀect on consumption and GHG concentration.
It is worth noting that for the same value of c∗ and M∗ the social value of catastrophic
risk reduction is always higher in the multiplicative model than in the additive one. This
suggests that the multiplicative model may be more prone to avoiding catastrophic risks.
To study the magnitude of these eﬀects, we now turn to a numerical version of the
model. It will allow us to compare not only the steady state equilibria, but also the optimal
dynamics of the two models. We will also investigate the role of two key parameters: the
rate of pure time preference θ (or the associated temporal risk aversion parameter ε) and
the consumption level c equivalent to the post regime shift welfare.
5 A quantitative illustration
5.1 Functional forms, parameters and solution method
To illustrate quantitatively the implications of the additive and multiplicative models, we
proceed in three steps. First, we use our model to approximate BAU trajectories (i.e.
no climate externality) for output and the stock of GHG in the DICE model (Nordhaus,
2008). We will do so under the standard additive representation of preferences, taking most
functional forms and parameters from Nordhaus (2008), and selecting remaining parameters
to ﬁt BAU trajectories. The parameters are summarized in Table 1. Second, we introduce
a hazard rate schedule describing the risk of catastrophic collapse as a function of the GHG
stock. Third, we specify the social objectives under additive and multiplicative preference
representations. This last step will enable us to simulate optimal paths with and without
endogeneity in the risk of catastrophic collapse.
Under additive preferences, the BAU problem (13) reduces to a standard optimal growth
problem a la Ramsey (see Appendix B). Assuming that potential output is represented by
the function yt = Ak
α
t , with α = 0.3 as in Nordhaus (2008), it is straightforward to obtain
analytical expressions for steady state quantities.7 The total factor productivity (TFP)
7 The BAU expressions for the steady state capital stock and consumption given additive preferences are
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Table 1: Functional forms and parameters
Parameter Value Source
Production technology: yt = Ak
α
t
A Total factor productivity 8.5 Calibrated
α Share of capital 0.3 Nordhaus (2008)
k0 Initial capital stock 0.99 Calibrated
δ Rate of depreciation 0.1 Nordhaus (2008)
Carbon cycle: ∆Mt = κz
β
t − ψ
(
Mt − M¯
)
κ Emissions intensity 0.29 Calibrated
β Abatement cost parameter 2.7 Nordhaus (2008)
ψ Exogenous emissions’ decay 0.005 Calibrated
M Pre-industrial stock of emissions 596.4 Nordhaus (2008)
M0 Initial pollution stock 808.9 Nordhaus (2008)
Instantaneous utility function: u(c) =
c1−γ−c1−γ
1−γ
γ Marginal utility parameter 2.1 Calibrated
c Post-collapse consumption 1 –
θ Pure rate of time preference (additive model) 0.015 Nordhaus (2008)
ε Temporal risk aversion (multiplicative model) 0.0014 Calibrated
parameter A is then calibrated so that BAU steady state output in our model equals per
capita output in 2100 in the DICE model, given the assumed pure rate of time preferences
in the additive model (1.5%, see below) and a depreciation rate of 10% taken from Nordhaus
(2008). The initial capital stock (k0) is then chosen so that initial output y0 equals DICE’s
per capita output in the initial year (2005).
The DICE model features a detailed representation of the carbon cycle, whereas we only
have one equation describing the dynamics of the pollution stock (Equation (1)). Never-
theless, we ﬁnd that we can approximate GHG dynamics reasonably well. First, the initial
pollution stock M0 = 808.9 GtC and the pre-industrial GHG concentration M = 596.4 GtC
are taken directly from DICE. Second, the natural decay of the stock, measured by ψ in our
model, is determined as follows. We simulate the decay of the stock of GHG in the DICE
model by switching oﬀ emissions from 2005 onwards. We then select the value of ψ that
minimizes the sum of squared deviations between the decay trajectory implied by the DICE
given by:
k
∗ =
(
Aα
δ + ρ
) 1
1−α
and c∗ = A(k∗)α − δk∗.
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model and that implied by the linear stock dynamics of our model. Third, the function
describing emissions per unit of output is taken from the DICE model, i.e. ϕ(zt) = κz
β
t ,
with β = 2.7. Finally, the parameter κ, which measures uncontrolled emissions intensity
per unit of output, is chosen so as to minimize least squares deviations between the BAU
path for the stock of GHG in the DICE model and in our model, given BAU trajectories for
yt and the natural decay parameter ψ.
The hazard risk of catastrophic collapse is described by the function µ(M) = µ0 +
µ1(M − M)
σ. The exogenous hazard parameter is set to µ0 = 10
−5, which implies a
survival probability of 90% after 10,000 years and 40% after 100,000 years. As the GHG
stock increases above M , the hazard risk increases with parameters µ1 and σ. We consider
two alternative parametrization for the hazard function, illustrated in Figure 1. Under the
“low” risk proﬁle, the endogenous part of the hazard risk, µ1(M −M)
σ, remains below µ0
when the stock doubles relative to M , but it increases to 0.01% when the stock triples.
This implies that a tripling of the GHG stock would reduce the survival probability by 2.5
percentage points after 1,000 years. Under the “high” risk proﬁle, the endogenous part of
the hazard rate is 100 times larger for the same pollution stock, reaching 1% for a tripling
of the initial stock. Under this proﬁle, a mere doubling of the stock reduces the survival
probability by 3 percentage points after only 100 years.8
Turning to the representation of social preferences, instantaneous utility is given by
u(ct) =
c1−γ−c1−γ
1−γ . We calibrate γ such that the initial saving rate in the BAU is 22% as
in the DICE model. The post-collapse consumption level c is set to 1, which corresponds
to an 85% reduction of the initial consumption level (around $6,500 per capita per year).
We stress that our aim is not to portray a speciﬁc catastrophe linked with climate change.
Rather we see this quantitative exercise as a way to illustrate the magnitude of the modeling
choices. We will examine the importance of c for our results in Section 5.4.
In the additive model, the pure rate of time preference θ is 1.5% per year, which is the
baseline in the analysis of the DICE model by Nordhaus (2008). As discussed in Section
4.1, we calibrate the temporal risk aversion parameter in the multiplicative model such that
8This is still a lower bound of the illustrative calculations conducted by Weitzman (2009), as he suggests
that there is a one percent probability that climate sensitivity could be above 20◦C. Since climate sensitivity
measures the equilibrium change in temperatures following a doubling of GHG concentration, this can be
interpreted as the risk associated with a doubling of GHG concentrations. Nevertheless the numbers used in
the high risk profile are roughly in the same ballpark.
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Figure 1: Pollution stock and hazard risk of collapse
(a) Low risk proﬁle
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(b) High risk proﬁle
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both models predict the same BAU steady state interest rate. This is achieved by setting
ε = θ/u(c∗), where c∗ is BAU steady state consumption in the additive model (see footnote
7). We will return to the choice of θ in Section 5.4.
We solve the numerical versions of problems (13) and (20) as discrete time non-linear
programs. Indeed the stochasticity of the problem is summarized in the function v(µt, ct), so
that standard tools from mathematical programming can be employed. In an optimization
framework however it is not possible to formulate an inﬁnite horizon program, since it would
require maximizing a sum with an inﬁnite number of terms subject to an inﬁnite number
of constraints. We thus truncate the horizon of the problem to a ﬁnite number of periods,
and approximate the solution to the inﬁnite horizon problem with a state variable targeting
approach (Lau et al., 2002).9
9If the time horizon of the problem is finite, the optimal shadow values of the stock variables are zero
in finite time. Hence typically, the solution of the finite horizon problem differs from its infinite horizon
counterpart. These terminal effects can be avoided by adding equilibrium conditions targeting the post-
terminal evolution of the shadow values to be consistent with the infinite horizon solution. This approach
involves formulating the problem in the mixed complementarity format, which exploits the equilibrium
conditions relating the constraints of the primal problem and their associated multipliers, as defined by
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Following Lau et al. (2002), we exploit conditions relating the rate of
change of investment to that of output to target the post-terminal value of the capital stock, and similarly
we target the post-terminal value of pollution with (the negative of) the rate of change of the technology
index zt to that of output. We formulate the system of complementarity relationships in GAMS and solve it
with the PATH algorithm (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995).
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5.2 Business as usual and TFP shock
We start by comparing the BAU paths implied by the additive and multiplicative models.
Given our calibration procedure both models admit the same steady state interest rate, and
by Proposition 2 the steady state capital stock and consumption level are identical. In the
additive case, it is possible to derive closed-form solutions for the steady state values of the
capital stock and consumption level (see footnote 7), and this can be used to validate both
the calibration procedure and the accuracy of the solution method.
Figure 2 reports the optimal paths for ct and kt, as well as the value of their respective
analytical steady state. All paths converge to their theoretical values, which demonstrates
that both models can rationalize the same BAU economy, but also that we numerically
approximate the true steady state with a high precision. Moreover, while the transition paths
can potentially diﬀer between the additive and the multiplicative speciﬁcations, optimal
trajectories are almost identical. We note that the multiplicative model suggests a slightly
more rapid convergence towards the steady state. This is because the discount rate is
endogenous according to the multiplicative model, and thus changes during the transition.
Figure 2: Business as usual calibration and TFP shock
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Further evidence about the similarity between the two choice models in the absence of
an endogenous catastrophic risk is provided by looking at the response to a TFP shock.
Figure 2 displays the optimal transition paths under a 5% increase in the TFP parameter
(A) from t = 0 onwards (curve labeled “TFP shock”). We ﬁnd that both the steady state
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values and the transition paths remain almost identical in both models.
5.3 Optimal climate policy under endogenous catastrophic collapse
We now consider the case where the planner takes into account the relationship between the
stock of pollution and the hazard risk of catastrophic collapse. Optimal paths for consump-
tion ct, pollution stock Mt and the hazard risk µt under the two alternative speciﬁcations
of the risk proﬁles and social preferences are reported in Figure 3. We also report BAU
trajectories as a reference, which are labeled as “no risk”.
In the presence of a collapse risk, consumption in every period is lower than under BAU.
However, the magnitude of the decline varies greatly across risk proﬁles and preferences
representations. Starting with the low risk proﬁle, the consumption trajectory under the
additive model does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from BAU. Similarly, the stock of GHG remains
very close to BAU, and the reduction in the hazard risk is negligible. By 2150, the risk of
collapse related to the stock of pollution is around 0.01% per year.
In the framework we consider, a reduction of emissions can be achieved either by using
a cleaner but costly technology (i.e. choosing zt < 1), or slowing down the accumulation
of capital by increasing consumption. As shown in Figure 4, the optimal solution under
additive preferences and a low risk proﬁle only uses the latter option. Since the economy
produces with the dirty but eﬃcient technology (zt = 1), slowing down capital accumulation
allows the consumption trajectory to remain close to BAU. In the steady state, however,
both capital and consumption are lower than their BAU counterpart.
In contrast to the additive model, under multiplicative preferences emissions reductions
are drastic even when the planner faces a low risk proﬁle. The dirty technology is used for
the ﬁrst 15 periods, but then z falls below one and the consumption trajectory signiﬁcantly
diverges from BAU. This keeps the steady state stock of emissions below 1200 GtC. This
threshold, which corresponds to a doubling of GHG concentration compared to the pre-
industrial level, is therefore never reached with multiplicative preferences.
Turning to the high risk proﬁle, the multiplicative model suggests an immediate use of
clean technology, with around 40% of output being diverted to lower emissions through zt.
Given this, both the consumption level and the stock of emissions do not grow beyond their
2010 levels. With the additive model there is still no change in technology in the ﬁrst years,
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Figure 3: Optimal consumption and pollution under endogenous catastrophic risk
(a) Additive model
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
2005 2050 2100 2150
Pe
rc
ap
ita
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
(th
ou
sa
nd
s o
f 2
00
5 U
S$
)
No risk
Low risk
High risk
(b) Multiplicative model
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and a much smaller adjustment in the long term. This implies very diﬀerent level of risks
tolerated by the planner. In the multiplicative model the endogenous part of the hazard rate
is reduced below the level of the exogenous risk (µ0 =0.001%). With additive preferences,
the hazard rate is around 0.02% by 2100, which would reduce the survival probability below
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.17
models-as-usual for unusual risks? 24
Figure 4: Optimal abatement under endogenous catastrophic risk
(a) Additive model
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(b) Multiplicative model
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80% after 1,000 years.
One may notice that the trajectories obtained with the additive model and high risk is
quite close to those derived with the multiplicative model and low risk. Therefore, switching
from the additive to the multiplicative model has about the same impact as a 100-fold
increase in the hazard risk proﬁle. This suggests that the attention given to the form of social
preferences matters as much as the quantiﬁcation of risks associated with GHG emissions.
In particular, in the presence of an unusual catastrophic risk such as climate change, where
there are little observations to inform the representation of social preferences, it should at
least be recognized that the assumptions underlying the traditional additive model have
tremendous consequences for policy recommendations.
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5.4 The role of post-collapse welfare and time preferences
Let us now turn to the role of main parameters determining the magnitude of the catastro-
phe, namely the level of post-collapse consumption c, and the choice of the discount rate
in the additive model (which also determines temporal risk aversion in the multiplicative
model).
The choice of c does not inﬂuence the qualitative nature of our results, but Figure 5
shows that it greatly matters for the magnitude of the policy response. The value for c
depends on the kind of collapse risk one may think of, and is thus debatable. Our aim
here is only to illustrate how this parameter inﬂuences our quantitative results. The value
used so far (c = 1) corresponds to an 85% decrease of consumption. We now consider two
additional post-collapse consumption levels: (i) c = 0.5 (more severe poverty); (ii) c = 0.01,
a prospect that could be associated with human extinction.
Reducing post-collapse consumption from c = 1 to c = 0.5 has a relatively small impact
on optimal paths (compare Figure 3 and Figure 5). Moreover, the change in optimal tra-
jectories is similar under additive and multiplicative preferences, although the diﬀerences
between models remain (i.e. the stock of emissions is signiﬁcantly lower with the multiplica-
tive model). Similarly, moving to c = 0.01 involves much more drastic intervention but the
qualitative diﬀerences between models are preserved.
Quantitatively, we observe that the path derived with additive preferences and a low
value of post-collapse consumption, c = 0.01, is close to the one derived with multiplicative
preferences and c = 1. This suggests a correspondence between the magnitude of the
catastrophic collapse and the choice of the social preference representation, similarly to the
above discussion about alternative hazard risk schedules. Moreover, our simulations show
that, for both models, c = 0.01 with a low risk proﬁle implies roughly the same equilibrium
as c = 1 with a high risk proﬁle.
The second parameter we consider, namely the pure rate of time preferences in the ad-
ditive model (θ), is a highly contentious parameter in the economic literature on climate
change. As we have shown earlier, it partly determines the diﬀerence in how the multi-
plicative and the additive model respond to an endogenous hazard risk (see Section 4.2).
The value used by Nordhaus (2008) of 1.5%, which is based on a revealed preference argu-
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Figure 5: The role of post-collapse consumption level (c) under endogenous hazard risk
(a) Additive model
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(b) Multiplicative model
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ment using market interest rates, has been criticized by Stern (2007) among others as being
unethically high. In the following, we thus use a discount rate of 0.1% as in Stern (2007).
In order to compare both models, we re-calibrate the parameters so that the two models
yield the same BAU steady state interest rate. In particular, the choice of θ also determines
the temporal risk aversion parameter in the multiplicative model ε. Moreover, changing the
discount rate also modiﬁes incentives to accumulate capital in the BAU, and we re-calibrate
the TFP parameter to remain on the same benchmark path for output and emissions.10 Fig-
ure 6 compares the additive model with a discount rate of 0.1%, with a multiplicative model
re-calibrated to produce the same BAU steady state interest rate. As above, we contrast op-
10Since our calibration procedure targets the path for output, the BAU consumption path slightly differs
from that reported in Figure 3. More important for our analysis, the BAU emissions path and associated
hazard risk are however exactly identical.
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Figure 6: Comparing additive and multiplicative models under low time preferences (θ =
0.1%)
(a) Additive model
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(b) Multiplicative model
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timal paths under the low risk proﬁle and two alternative post-collapse consumption levels,
namely c = 0.5 and c = 0.01. We stress that our objective remains to compare how additive
and multiplicative models that rationalize the same BAU economy respond to information
about a hazard risk of catastrophic collapse.
Under a low value for the pure rate of time preference, here θ = 0.1%, optimal trajec-
tories for additive and multiplicative preferences are very close. This was expected from
Proposition 3: the equations deﬁning the steady state become very similar when the pure
rate of time preference approaches zero. The simulations further show that, for the particu-
lar parametrization we consider, reducing θ in the additive model signiﬁcantly increases the
abatement eﬀorts, whereas trajectories for the multiplicative model remain close to those
reported in Figure 5. This is so because reducing θ in the additive model increases the value
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of catastrophic risk reduction, and in the present conﬁguration this eﬀect dominates the
discounting eﬀect.
We thus conclude that diﬀerences between both models are not irreconcilable, and hinge
upon the view of the appropriate pure rate of time preference prevailing in the additive
model. Nevertheless, our simulations indicate that it is the paths of the additive model that
converge towards those of the multiplicative models rather than the opposite. This therefore
reinforces our message that basing policy recommendations solely upon the additive model in
conjunction with a more conventional value for the pure rate of time preference (θ > 1%) has
very strong implications when considering the trade-oﬀ between consumption and hazard
risk reduction.
6 Concluding remarks
Economic studies about individual portfolio choice have long discussed the role of risk aver-
sion. It is now well accepted that individuals may dislike taking risk, and that risk aversion
is an element that has to be integrated into studies about the optimal degree of risk taking.
Very similarly, one might think that discussions on optimal catastrophic risk prevention
should account for risk aversion with respect to intertemporal utility. So far however, the
literature on climate change has not done so in a framework able to capture a risk of catas-
trophic collapse. The reason is that most studies on climate change, and more generally on
environmental regime shifts, rely on additively separable preferences, and these preferences
are risk neutral with respect to risks on intertemporal utility.
In the current paper, we have considered multiplicative preferences displaying such risk
aversion. In the case where catastrophic risks are exogenous and constant, the multiplicative
model behaves almost like the standard additive model. However, as soon as we consider
endogenous catastrophic risks, the two models radically diﬀer, the multiplicative model
advocating a much tighter policy response. We thereby highlight that including risk aversion
with respect to intertemporal utility in the analysis has strong implications regarding the
appropriate level of action. Loosely speaking, selecting the representation of preferences
has the same quantitative implication, in terms of optimal plans, as a large change in
the catastrophic risk schedule. Considering alternative choice models may therefore seem
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relevant for the kind of risk associated with climate change.
Our paper takes an original position within the debate on climate policy. Since the report
by Stern (2007) the debate has focused on the opposition between a prescriptive approach
(holding that the choice of a social objectives should be guided by philosophical arguments),
and a descriptive approach (arguing that only welfare functions that are compatible with
the observed market interest rates should be considered). This debate has focused on the
parameters of the additive social welfare function, rather than on its structure. Without
entering into this debate, we show that even if we constrain ourselves to social welfare
functions that are compatible with the observed interest rates, assumptions regarding the
structure of the social welfare functions are central.
Just like for the choice of the pure rate of time preferences, there is a number of impor-
tant ethical questions surrounding risk aversion with respect to intertemporal utility. In the
simple case of a constant welfare and a risk on the planning horizon, Bommier and Zuber
(2008) have showed that such risk aversion implies preferences for catastrophe avoidance in
the sense of Keeney (1980) and Fishburn (1984): the society prefers a sure number of death
(or existing generations) to a risk on this number having the same expectation. There have
been debates about the ethical appeal of preferences for catastrophe avoidance. Some, like
Fleurbaey (2010), would actually argue in favor of risk equity, that is the opposite of prefer-
ences for catastrophe avoidance, because the social planner may dislike ex-post inequalities.
Others, like Keeney (1980), Fishburn (1984), Manski and Tetenov (2007) or Bommier and
Zuber (2008), argue that positive preferences for catastrophe avoidance is the most natural
assumption. Even if there are divergences in opinion about the degree of preference for
catastrophe avoidance, the solution which consist in ruling out this parameter for easier
tractability does not seem to be defendable. Our work has illustrated that preferences for
catastrophe avoidance is a key ingredient for discussing the mitigation of catastrophic risks,
and hence climate change.
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Appendix A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of (a).
Using Eq. (10) in the additive case, we obtain:
∂W (c)
∂cT
= exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(θ + µt)dt
)
u′(cT )
and
∂W (c)
∂µT
= −
∫ +∞
T
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
(θ + µτ )dτ
)
u(ct)dt
Hence,
−
d
dT
(
log
∂W (c)
∂cT
)
|c˙T=0 = −
−(θ + µT ) exp
(
−
∫ T
0 (θ + µt)dt
)
u′(cT )
exp
(
−
∫ T
0 (θ + µt)dt
)
u′(cT )
= θ + µT
and
−
(
∂W (c)
∂µT
)/(
∂W (c)
∂cT
)
=
∫ +∞
T
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
(θ+µτ )dτ
)
u(ct)dt
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(θ+µt)dt
)
u′(cT )
=
∫ +∞
T
exp
(
−
∫ t
T
(θ+µτ )dτ
)
u(ct)dt
u′(cT )
.
Proof of (b).
Using Eq. (10) in the multiplicative case, we obtain:
∂W (c)
∂cT
= exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(εu(ct) + µt)dt
)
u′(cT )− εu
′(cT )
∫ +∞
T
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
(εu(cτ ) + µτ )dτ
)
u(ct)dt
= exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(εu(ct) + µt)dt
)
u′(cT )
(
1− εU(c, T )
)
and
∂W (c)
∂µT
= −
∫ +∞
T
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
(εu(cτ ) + µτ )dτ
)
u(ct)dt = − exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(εu(ct) + µt)dt
)
U(c, T )
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Hence,
−
d
dT
(
log
∂W (c)
∂cT
)
|c˙T=0 =
−
−(εu(cT ) + µT ) exp
(
−
∫ T
0 (εu(ct) + µt)dt
)
u′(cT ) + εu
′(cT ) exp
(
−
∫ T
0 (εu(ct) + µt)dt
)
u(cT )
exp
(
−
∫ T
0 (εu(ct) + µt)dt
)
u′(cT )
(
1− εU(c, T )
)
= µT1−εU(c,T )
and
−
(
∂W (c)
∂µT
)/(
∂W (c)
∂cT
)
=
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(εu(ct)+µt)dt
)
U(c,T )
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(εu(ct)+µt)dt
)
u′(cT )
(
1−εU(c,T )
) = U(c,T )
u′(cT )
(
1−εU(c,T )
) .
Appendix B Optimal dynamics and steady state: BAU problem
In the case of the additive model, the BAU problem is just the standard Ramsey optimal
growth problem (with µ0 + θ replacing θ). So the optimal dynamics and the steady state
are well-known.
In the multiplicative case, the BAU problem can be rewritten:
maxc
∫ +∞
0
e−Ωtu(ct)dt
s.t. k˙t = f(kt)− δkt − ct
Ω˙t = µ0 + εu(ct)
The Hamiltonian of this problem is:
H(t, ct, zt, kt,Mt,Ωt) = e
−Ωtu(ct) + λt
{
f(kt)− δkt − ct
}
+ηt
{
µ0 + εu(ct)
}
.
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The ﬁrst order necessary conditions of are:
∂H
∂c
= e−Ωtu′(ct)− λt + ηt εu
′(ct) = 0 (33)
λ˙t = −
∂H
∂k
= −λt(f
′(kt)− δ) (34)
η˙t = −
∂H
∂Ω
= e−Ωt u(ct) (35)
Equation (35) implies that ηt = η(0) +
∫ t
0 e
−Ωτu(cτ )dτ . The transversality condition
limt→+∞ ηt = 0 yields η(0) = −
∫+∞
0 e
−Ωτu(cτ )dτ . Hence ηt = −
∫+∞
t e
−Ωτu(cτ )dτ . Denote
Ut =
∫+∞
t e
−(Ωτ−Ωt)u(cτ )dτ the future expected utility discounted at period t. We obtain
ηt = −e
−ΩtUt, (36)
so that, using (35),
U˙t = Ω˙Ut − u(ct). (37)
Using Equation (36), Equation (33) can be rewritten:
e−Ωt
{
1− εUt
}
u′(ct) = λt
Diﬀerentiating each term in the above equation with respect to time and dividing by the
corresponding term in the equation, we obtain:
−Ω˙t −
εU˙t
1− εUt
+ c˙t
u′′(ct)
u′(ct)
=
λ˙t
λt
Given Equation (37), we obtain Ω˙t+
εU˙t
1−εUt
=
(1−εUt)Ω˙t+ε
(
Ω˙Ut−u(ct)
)
1−εUt
= Ω˙t−εu(ct)1−εUt =
µ0
1−εUt
.
Combining this equality, Equation (34) and the previous equation, we have:
c˙t =
u′(ct)
u′′(ct)
(
µ0
1− εUt
+
λ˙t
λt
)
= −
u′(ct)
u′′(ct)
(
f ′(kt)− δ −
µ0
1− εUt
)
(38)
In the end, the optimal dynamics for the BAU problem with multiplicative preferences
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are given by the dynamic system:
c˙t = −
u′(ct)
u′′(ct)
(
f ′(kt)− δ −
µ0
1− εUt
)
(39)
k˙t = f(kt)− ct (40)
U˙t = Ω˙Ut − u(ct) =
(
µ0 + εu(ct)
)
Ut − u(ct) (41)
In a steady state, U˙t = 0 implies that U
∗ = u(c
∗)
µ0+εu(c∗)
, so that µ01−εU∗ = µ0 + εu(c
∗).
Consequently, in steady state, Equations (39)-(40) yield the Equations (18)-(19), which
characterize a steady state for an interior solution of Problem (13) in the multiplicative
case.
Appendix C Optimal dynamics and steady state: Additive model
Denote Ωt =
∫ t
0
{
µ(τ) + θ
}
dτ and notice that Ω˙t = µt + θ = µ(Mt) + θ. Problem (20) can
be rewritten:
maxc,z
∫ +∞
0
e−Ωtu(ct)dt
s.t. k˙t = ztf(kt)− δkt − ct
M˙t = ϕ(zt)f(kt)− ψ(Mt − M¯)
Ω˙t = µ(Mt) + θ
The Hamiltonian of this problem is
H(t, ct, zt, kt,Mt,Ωt) = e
−Ωtu(ct) + λt
{
ztf(kt)− δkt − ct
}
+κt
{
ϕ(zt)f(kt)− ψ(Mt − M¯)
}
+ηt
{
µ(Mt) + θ
}
.
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The ﬁrst order necessary conditions are:
∂H
∂c
= e−Ωtu′(ct)− λt = 0 (42)
∂H
∂z
= λtf(kt) + κtϕ
′(zt)f(kt) = 0 (43)
λ˙t = −
∂H
∂k
= −λtztf
′(kt) + λtδ − κtϕ(zt)f
′(kt) (44)
κ˙t = −
∂H
∂M
= −µ′(Mt)ηt + κt ψ (45)
η˙t = e
−Ωtu(ct) (46)
Equation (43) can be rewritten as:
κt = −
λt
ϕ′(zt)
(47)
Equation (44) hence becomes:
λ˙t = −
({
zt −
ϕ(zt)
ϕ′(zt)
}
f ′(kt)− δ
)
λt (48)
We denote π(zt) = zt −
ϕ(zt)
ϕ′(zt)
. Since ϕ is convex, π is increasing.
Equation (42) yields e−Ωtu′(ct) = λt. Diﬀerentiating both terms of the equation with
respect to time and dividing by the corresponding term of the original equation, we obtain:
u′′(ct)
u′(ct)
c˙t − Ω˙t =
u′′(ct)
u′(ct)
c˙t − θ − µ(Mt) =
λ˙t
λt
Using Equation (48), we ﬁnally get:
c˙t = −
u′(ct)
u′′(ct)
(
π(zt)f
′(kt)− δ − θ − µ(Mt)
)
Equation (46) implies that ηt = η(0) +
∫ t
0 e
−Ωτu(cτ )dτ . The transversality condition
limt→+∞ ηt = 0 yields η(0) = −
∫+∞
0 e
−Ωτu(cτ )dτ . Hence ηt = −
∫+∞
t e
−Ωτu(cτ )dτ , so that:
ηt = −e
−ΩtUt, (49)
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and, by (42),
ηt = −
Ut
u′(ct)
λt. (50)
Using (47) and (50), Equation (45) becomes:
κ˙t =
(
ψ − µ′(Mt)ϕ
′(zt)
Ut
u′(ct)
)
κt
Diﬀerentiating each term in Equation (47) with respect to time and dividing by the
corresponding term in (47), we obtain:
κ˙t
κt
= −z˙t
ϕ′′(zt)
ϕ′(zt)
+
λ˙t
λt
Hence:
z˙t =
ϕ′(zt)
ϕ′′(zt)
(
λ˙t
λt
−
κ˙t
κt
)
=
ϕ′(zt)
ϕ′′(zt)
(
µ′(Mt)ϕ
′(zt)
Ut
u′(ct)
+ δ −
{
ψ + π(zt)f
′(kt)
})
Gathering all the results and the equations of motion for k and M yields the following
dynamic system:
c˙t = −
u′(ct)
u′′(ct)
(
π(zt)f
′(kt)− δ − ρ(ct, t)
)
(51)
z˙t =
ϕ′(zt)
ϕ′′(zt)
(
µ′(Mt)ϕ
′(zt)V(ct, t) + δ −
{
ψ + π(zt)f
′(kt)
})
(52)
k˙t = ztf(kt)− ct (53)
M˙t = ϕ(zt)f(kt)− ψ(Mt − M¯) (54)
In a steady state, U∗ = u(c
∗)
µ(M∗)+θ . Hence Equations (51)-(54) yield Equations (51)-(54),
which characterize a steady state for an interior solution of Problem (20) in the additive
case.
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Appendix D Optimal dynamics and steady state: Multiplicative model
Problem (20) can be rewritten:
maxc,z
∫ +∞
0
e−Ωtu(ct)dt
s.t. k˙t = ztf(kt)− δkt − ct
M˙t = ϕ(zt)f(kt)− ψ(Mt − M¯)
Ω˙t = µ(Mt) + εu(ct)
The Hamiltonian of this problem is
H(t, ct, zt, kt,Mt,Ωt) = e
−Ωtu(ct) + λt
{
ztf(kt)− δkt − ct
}
+κt
{
ϕ(zt)f(kt)− ψ(Mt − M¯)
}
+ηt
{
µ(Mt) + εu(ct)
}
.
The ﬁrst order necessary conditions are:
∂H
∂c
= e−Ωtu′(ct)− λt + ηt εu
′(ct) = 0 (55)
∂H
∂z
= λtf(kt) + κtϕ
′(zt)f(kt) = 0 (56)
λ˙t = −
∂H
∂k
= −λtztf
′(kt) + λtδ − κtϕ(zt)f
′(kt) (57)
κ˙t = −
∂H
∂M
= κt ψ − ηt µ
′(Mt) (58)
η˙t = −
∂H
∂Ω
= e−Ωt u(ct) (59)
Equation (56) can be rewritten as:
κt = −
λt
ϕ′(zt)
(60)
Equation (57) hence becomes:
λ˙t = −
(
π(zt)f
′(kt)− δ
)
λt (61)
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where π is deﬁned like in Appendix C.
Equation (59) implies that ηt = η(0) +
∫ t
0 e
−Ωτu(cτ )dτ . The transversality condition
limt→+∞ ηt = 0 yields η(0) = −
∫+∞
0 e
−Ωτu(cτ )dτ . Hence ηt = −
∫+∞
t e
−Ωτu(cτ )dτ . Denote
Ut =
∫+∞
t e
−(Ωτ−Ωt)u(cτ )dτ the future expected utility discounted at period t. We obtain
ηt = −e
−ΩtUt, (62)
so that, using (59),
U˙t = Ω˙Ut − u(ct). (63)
Using Equation (62), Equation (55) can be rewritten:
e−Ωt
{
1− εUt
}
u′(ct) = λt
Diﬀerentiating each term in the above equation with respect to time and dividing by the
corresponding term in the equation, we obtain:
−Ω˙t −
εU˙t
1− εUt
+ c˙t
u′′(ct)
u′(ct)
=
λ˙t
λt
Given Equation (63), we obtain Ω˙t+
εU˙t
1−εUt
=
(1−εUt)Ω˙t+ε
(
Ω˙Ut−u(ct)
)
1−εUt
= Ω˙t−εu(ct)1−εUt =
µ(Mt)
1−εUt
.
Combining this equality, Equation (61) and the previous equation, we have:
c˙t =
u′(ct)
u′′(ct)
(
µ(Mt)
1− εUt
+
λ˙t
λt
)
= −
u′(ct)
u′′(ct)
(
π(zt)f
′(kt)− δ −
µ(Mt)
1− εUt
)
(64)
Equations (55) and (62) also imply λt
ηt
=
(
e−Ωt+εηt
ηt
)
u′(ct) = −
1−εUt
Ut
u′(ct), so that
ηt
κt
= Ut1−εUt
ϕ′(zt)
u′(ct)
. Hence Equation (58) can be rewritten:
κ˙t =
{
ψ −
Ut
u′(ct)− εu′(ct)Ut
µ′(Mt)ϕ
′(zt)
}
κt (65)
Diﬀerentiating each term in Equation (56) with respect to time and dividing by the
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corresponding term in (56), we obtain:
κ˙t
κt
= −z˙t
ϕ′′(zt)
ϕ′(zt)
+
λ˙t
λt
Hence, by Equations (61) and (65):
z˙t =
ϕ′(zt)
ϕ′′(zt)
(
λ˙t
λt
−
κ˙t
κt
)
=
ϕ′(zt)
ϕ′′(zt)
(
Ut
u′(ct)− εu′(ct)Ut
µ′(Mt)ϕ
′(zt) + δ −
{
ψ + π(zt)f
′(kt)
})
(66)
Gathering Equations (63), (64), (66), and the equations of motion for k and M yields
the dynamic system:
c˙t = −
u′(ct)
u′′(ct)
(
π(zt)f
′(kt)− δ − ρ(ct, t)
)
(67)
z˙t =
ϕ′(zt)
ϕ′′(zt)
(
V(ct, t)µ
′(Mt)ϕ
′(zt) + δ −
{
ψ + π(zt)f
′(kt)
})
(68)
k˙t = ztf(kt)− ct (69)
M˙t = ϕ(zt)f(kt)− ψ(Mt − M¯) (70)
U˙t = Ω˙Ut − u(ct) =
(
µ(Mt) + εu(ct)
)
Ut − u(ct) (71)
In a steady state, U˙t = 0 implies that U
∗ = u(c
∗)
µ(M∗)+εu(c∗) , so that ρ =
µ(M∗)
1−εU∗ = µ(M
∗) +
εu(c∗) and V∗ = U
∗
u′(c∗)−εu′(c∗)U∗ =
u(c∗)
u′(c∗)µ(M∗) . Consequently, in steady state, Equations
(67)-(70) yield the Equations (29)-(32), which characterize a steady state for an interior
solution of Problem (20) in the multiplicative case.
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